LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources
Volume 9
Issue 2 Spring 2021
5-5-2022

Critical Decisions: The Challenge of Defining Critical Habitat
Under the Endangered Species Act
Jeffrey S. Knighton Jr.

Repository Citation
Jeffrey S. Knighton Jr., Critical Decisions: The Challenge of Defining Critical Habitat Under the Endangered
Species Act, 9 LSU J. of Energy L. & Resources (2022)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jelr/vol9/iss2/13

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources by an authorized editor
of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Critical Decisions: The Challenge of Defining Critical
Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .............................................................................. 563
I.

Background............................................................................... 566
A. Pre-Endangered Species Act ............................................... 566
B. Passage of the Endangered Species Act ............................... 567
C. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill:
Realized Power of the ESA ................................................. 568
D. The Endangered Species Act Provisions.............................. 568

II.

Weyerhaeuser v. U.S Fish & Wildlife Service ............................ 571
A. Background ........................................................................ 571
B. Procedural History .............................................................. 572
C. The Supreme Court’s Analysis ............................................ 574

III. The Aftermath of Weyerhaeuser ................................................ 575
A. The Services’ Joint Rules: The 2019
Final Rule and the 2020 Final Rule ..................................... 575
B. Unresolved Issues ............................................................... 577
1. The Problem with Making the Definition
of Habitat an Administrative Decision .......................... 579
2. The Challenge of Defining Habitat................................ 581
a. Should Habitat be Habitable? ................................. 582
b. Should the Services Adopt a Broad
Definition of Habitat? ............................................. 586
IV. Solution .................................................................................... 591
A. Amending the Endangered Species Act ............................... 591
B. If There is No Congressional Action ................................... 594
Conclusion ................................................................................ 597
INTRODUCTION
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is one of the most popular and
well-known pieces of legislation. 1 However, few Americans understand
Copyright 2021, by JEFFREY S. KNIGHTON JR.
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how the ESA works. 2 Invocation of the ESA often conjures up thoughts of
protections for beloved animals such as bald eagles, bison, and grizzly
bears. 3 However, the statute represents a delicate balance between the goal
of preserving biodiversity and the costs of conservation. 4 While critics
often point to the low number of species that have been delisted as
endangered or threatened, overall the ESA has been successful in
achieving its core goal: preventing extinction of listed species. 5
The ESA’s prohibition on “taking” listed species is the most widely
recognized provision of the statute, but its habitat protections are
foundational to protecting listed species. 6 Habitat loss and degradation is
the leading cause of species endangerment. 7 Habitat is a basic requirement
of all living organisms; therefore, the protection of habitat is vital to
prevent extinction and promote recovery. 8 Thus, critical habitat
designations, the cornerstone of habitat protection under the ESA, play an
important role in species preservation and recovery. However, the habitat
1. Brian Czech & Paul R. Krausman, Public Opinion on Endangered
Species Conservation and Policy, 12 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 473 (1999).
2. BRIAN SEASHOLES, REASON FOUND., FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: THE CASE FOR AN ENDANGERED SPECIES RESERVE
PROGRAM 92 (2014) https://reason.org/wp-content/uploads/files/endangered_
species_act_reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6DA-PED5].
3. Shannon Petersen, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A Legislative
History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463, 467 (1999).
4. Id.
5. See Delisted Species, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., https://ecos.fws.gov
/ecp/report/species-delisted [https://perma.cc/K3CJ-JC5J] (last visited Apr. 19,
2021). Of the roughly 1750 species that have been listed (formally designated
under the specific procedures of the ESA) as endangered or threatened, only 11
species have gone extinct. 84 species and distinct populations have been delisted
(formally having their statutory protections revoked under the specific procedures
of the ESA): 63 based on recovery and 21 based on erroneous listing.
6. Section 9 (16 U.S.C. § 1538) of the ESA makes it illegal to “take” any
endangered species. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) defines “take” as “to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage
in any such conduct.”
7. Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by
the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 296
(1993).
8. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT 71, 73 (1995), http://nap.edu/4978 [https://perma.cc/4VMH-VAUV]. The
term “habitat,” as used in the ESA and scholarly literature on topic, is used
throughout this Comment in its uncountable noun form rather than its specific
countable form.
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protections under the ESA are where conservation, economic
development, and property interests collide. 9
The most recent and prolific conflict involving critical habitat
designations arose in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service. 10
A challenge to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (FWS) designation of
unoccupied critical habitat ultimately made its way to the United States
Supreme Court in 2018. 11 The Court’s unanimous ruling, while narrow,
provides a limitation on the FWS’s discretion in designating unoccupied
areas as critical habitat. 12 Even after Weyerhaeuser, many questions
remain unsettled, particularly since the FWS and the petitioners in
Weyerhaeuser reached a consent decree. 13
Part I of this Comment will outline the background of the ESA and its
legislative history. Part II will address Weyerhaeuser, including the
procedural history, the Court’s opinion, and the subsequent history. Part
III will analyze the implications of the Court’s ruling in Weyerhaeuser. It
will discuss the FWS and the National Marine Fisheries Service’s14
(NMFS, and together with FWS referred to as “the Services”) 2019 and
2020 published final rules that attempted to respond to Weyerhaeuser’s
holding, the limitations of agency action, and the challenges of defining
“habitat.” Part IV will discuss a legislative solution to the aftermath of
Weyerhaeuser, and in the alternative, why the Services’ 2019 and 2020
rules are the best intermediary solution.

9. See Thomas F. Darin, Designating Critical Habitat Under the
Endangered Species Act: Habitat Protection Versus Agency Discretion, 24 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 210 (2000).
10. 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 364.
13. Consent Decree, Markle Interests, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No.
13-cv-234 (E.D. La. July 3, 2019), ECF No. 174, available at https://www.eenews
.net/assets/2019/07/08/document_gw_04.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WJC-XUSL]. A
consent decree is a judicially recognized and enforceable settlement. The effect
of the consent decree was that the court no longer had the opportunity to rule on
the remaining issues in the case.
14. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service are
jointly responsible for administering the ESA: FWS for land and freshwater
species; NMFS for marine species. NMFS is also commonly referred to as
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Fisheries.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Endangered Species Act
Prior to the 1970’s, the federal government played little role in wildlife
management, as states retained the primary function in protecting
wildlife. 15 Most state regulations were not in the preservationist mold of
the modern ESA, but rather were fish and game regulations designed to
protect the interests of sportsmen and trappers. 16
At the turn of the twentieth century, Congress began to take steps
toward national wildlife regulation.17 In 1900, Congress enacted the Lacey
Act, prohibiting interstate commerce of wildlife, fish, and plants that have
been illegally taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of state or
local law. 18 The federal government continued to wade into wildlife
regulation when President Woodrow Wilson signed the Migratory Bird
Treaty of 1916 with Canada. 19 Two years later, the Senate ratified the
treaty through the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, prohibiting the
taking of certain protected migratory birds and giving authority to the
Secretary of the Interior to establish hunting regulations on migratory
game birds. 20 Despite Missouri challenging the statute on Tenth
Amendment grounds, the Supreme Court upheld the statute’s
constitutionality in Missouri v. Holland. 21 The Court upheld the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act on the basis of federal treaty-making power, but notably
rejected Missouri’s contention that the state ownership doctrine provides
that regulation of wildlife is an exclusive area of state sovereignty. 22 While
the federal government continued to take marginal steps in wildlife
management over the next 50 years, it was the growth of the environmental
movement in the 1960’s that ultimately spurred substantial legislation.23
15. Petersen, supra note 3, at 468.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Lacey Act, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (1900) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 701, 3371–3378 (2018)).
19. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Aug.
16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628.
20. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2018)).
21. 252 U.S. 416, 434–35 (1920).
22. Id.
23. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of
United States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law's First
Three Decades in the United States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 79 (2001); Petersen,
supra note 3, at 471–72.
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B. Passage of the Endangered Species Act
In 1970, the appetite for federal environmental legislation reached a
fever pitch as Congress passed several comprehensive environmental
statutes that now form the bedrock of United States environmental law.24
The first of these statutes to be passed by Congress include the National
Environmental Policy Act 25 and the Clean Air Act of 1970. 26 In 1972,
Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972 (now, as further amended, referred to as the Clean Water Act). 27
The last of these landmark legislations was the Endangered Species Act in
1973. 28 Carried by bipartisan support for strong protections of endangered
wildlife, the bill faced little opposition.29 Remarkably, the legislation
passed with a nearly unanimous vote. 30 The purpose of the ESA is threefold: (1) to provide a means to conserve the ecosystems upon which
threatened and endangered species depend; (2) to provide a program of
conservation for such threatened and endangered species; and (3) to take
steps to achieve the purposes of treaties which commit the United States
to protecting biodiversity. 31 The Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary
of Commerce, through the Services, are jointly designated to administer
the ESA. 32
The ESA designates protected species as either endangered or
threatened. 33 An endangered species is defined as a “species which is in
danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range,”34
while a threatened species is defined as a “species which is likely to
become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout
all or a significant portion of its range.” 35 There are two overarching
principal protections for listed species: (1) the general prohibition on
“taking” or trade of the species, 36 and (2) the requirement that all federal
agencies ensure that their actions do not “jeopardize the continued
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Petersen, supra note 3, at 471–72.
Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816.
Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884.
Petersen, supra note 3, at 473–80.
See 119 CONG. REC. 30,157–68 (1973).
16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2018); 50 C.F.R. §§ 424.01–424.21 (2020).
16 U.S.C. § 1532(15); see supra note 14.
16 U.S.C. § 1532.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
16 U.S.C. § 1538.
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existence” of listed species or “result in the destruction or adverse
modification” of critical habitat of the species.37 The latter protection is
achieved through Section 4’s requirement of critical habitat designation at
the time of listing38 and Section 7’s requirement that all federal agencies
consult with the Services to ensure that agency activities are “not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence” of a listed species nor “result in the
destruction or adverse modification of” critical habitat.39
C. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill: Realized Power of the ESA
The stark power of the ESA became immediately clear in 1978 when
the Supreme Court decided Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill. 40 This case
pitted the ESA’s protection of the snail darter, a small fish, against a dam
project that was nearly complete and that Congress had appropriated and
spent millions of dollars to construct.41 The Court insightfully described
the paradox that the “survival of a relatively small number of three-inch
fish among all the countless millions of species extant would require the
permanent halting of a virtually completed dam for which Congress ha[d]
expended more than $100 million.”42 The Court concluded that the ESA
“require[d] precisely that result.” 43 Importantly, at the time of the decision,
the ESA did not define critical habitat, so the Court relied upon the
Secretary of Interior’s definition, which was much broader and more
ambiguous than it is today. 44
D. The Endangered Species Act Provisions
The Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill
created bipartisan consternation and outrage in Congress. 45 Many in
Congress were concerned that the ESA was being interpreted and
implemented too broadly and without providing enough flexibility to
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1533.
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
40. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
41. Id. at 172.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 173.
44. Id. at 160 n.9 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 874 (1978)). The definition of critical
habitat was to be determined on the basis that “loss of which would appreciably
decrease the likelihood of the survival and recovery” of the species rather than
“essential to the conservation” of the species and allowed and could include areas
for “reasonable population expansion.” Id.
45. Petersen, supra note 3, at 485.
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consider economic development goals. 46 Within four months of the
Court’s decision, Congress amended the ESA. 47 The amendment formally
statutorized the definition of critical habitat in Section 3 and provided
mechanisms whereby exemptions to Section 7 could be granted.48
Lawmakers lauded the amendment as a step towards practicality and
further guidance on the ESA’s original intent. 49
One of the hallmark provisions of the ESA is Section 4’s requirement
of designation of critical habitat for a listed species.50 When the Services
list a species as endangered or threatened, the Services must also designate
the critical habitat of that species.51 Since the passage of the 1978
Amendment, Section 3 defines critical habitat as:
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the
species, at the time it is listed in accordance with the provisions of
section 1533 of this title, on which are found those physical or
biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species
and (II) which may require special management considerations or
protection; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the
species at the time it is listed in accordance with the provisions of
section 1533 of this title, upon a determination by the Secretary
that such areas are essential for the conservation of the species. 52
Furthermore, critical habitat shall “not include the entire geographical area
which can be occupied” by the listed species, except under special
circumstances determined by the Services.53
When an area is designated as critical habitat, it does not necessarily
directly affect a private landowner’s property rights. 54 However, it does

46. Id.
47. See Endangered Species Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat.
3751 (1978).
48. Id.
49. Norman D. James & Thomas J. Ward, Critical Habitat's Limited Role
Under the Endangered Species Act and Its Improper Transformation into
"Recovery" Habitat, 34 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 14–15 (2016).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) (2018).
51. Id.
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A).
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(C).
54. Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act, U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/southeast/endangered-species-act/critical-
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create major implications if a landowner plans to carry out activity that
requires federal licensing, permitting, or funding when such activity is
likely to affect the designated species or its critical habitat.55 Section 7 of
the ESA requires federal agencies to “insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out” by such agency “is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or
result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat.”56
This duty also extends to species proposed to be listed and critical habitat
proposed for designation. 57 Thus, once an area is designated or proposed
to be designated as critical habitat, any activity that will require federal
agency action will trigger consultation with the Services. 58
When there is a proposed federal agency action, the agency seeking to
implement the action must submit a request to the Services to determine if
there are listed species or critical habitat in the area that will be affected
by the action. 59 If a listed species or critical habitat is present in the
proposed action area, the action agency must prepare a biological
assessment. 60 The biological assessment will evaluate the “potential
effects of the action on such species and habitat” and whether formal
consultation under Section 7(a)(2) is necessary. 61 If the action agency
determines that the proposed action may affect listed species or critical
habitat, formal consultation is required. 62 The action agency and the
Services will conference to determine if the action is likely to “jeopardize
the continued existence of a listed species or result in the destruction or
adverse modification of critical habitat.” 63 At the end of formal
consultation, the Services will draft a biological opinion detailing the
likely effects of the action and whether it will jeopardize the continued
existence of the species. 64 If there is a “no jeopardy” opinion, the Services
will issue an incidental take statement if the action is likely to result in the
taking of listed species and the action may proceed. If there is a jeopardy
opinion, the biological opinion shall include, if available, “reasonable and
habitat/# critical-habitat-and-land-development-section [https://perma.cc/J6VNSWE4] (last visited Apr. 17, 2021).
55. Id.
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1); 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(c) (2020).
60. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1); 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(c).
61. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, 402.12(k).
62. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14.
63. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h).
64. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)–(i).
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prudent alternatives” that may be adopted to avoid violation of Section
7(a)(2) and allow the action to proceed. 65 Thus, even a jeopardy opinion
may not completely obstruct a proposed action.
Jeopardy biological opinions are rare, primarily because the action
agency and the Services have ample opportunity to revise and craft the
proposed action to avoid jeopardy and adverse modification of critical
habitat throughout the consultation process. 66 Moreover, a jeopardy
opinion may not ultimately halt a proposed action if reasonable prudent
alternatives are provided and adopted. 67 However, the process can be time
consuming and ultimately expensive for a party seeking federal action
subject to Section 7 consultation. 68 While an applicant does not pay for the
consultation process itself, the action agency and applicant are responsible
for coordinating with the Services in order to provide applicable
information and documentation in order to complete the consultation and
discuss and negotiate reasonable prudent alternatives if necessary. It is
likely that initial project plans will have to be reevaluated and changed in
order to comply with Section 7. Finally, any reasonable prudent
alternatives proposed or conditional upon approval may not be as cost
effective, profitable, or desirable as the initial proposed plan.
Consequently, commercial interests often view critical habitat
designations unfavorably. 69 While a critical habitat designation is not an
insurmountable obstacle for a development project, it is certain to ensure
a more expensive and time-consuming process.
II. WEYERHAEUSER V. U.S FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE
A. Background
As evidenced by Section 4 of the ESA, the Services have wide
discretion in the designation of critical habitat. 70 The extent of this
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(B) (2018); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(2).
66. Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small
Harms, 64 FLA. L. REV. 141, 164 (2012).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(B); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(2).
68. Generally, an action agency has 180 days to prepare a biological
assessment, 90 days for formal consultation, and the Services have 45 days to
prepare a biological opinion. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1), 1536(b); 50 C.F.R. §
402.14.
69. See James Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat Under
the Endangered Species Act, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 335–336 (1990)
(discussing opposition to critical habitat designations).
70. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2018).
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discretion was recently challenged in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service. 71 Weyerhaeuser centered on the FWS proposal “to
designate as unoccupied critical habitat a 1,544‒acre site in St. Tammany
Parish, Louisiana,” dubbed Unit 1, for the dusky gopher frog. 72 The FWS
had listed the dusky gopher frog as endangered in 2001. 73 At one time, the
dusky gopher frog lived in longleaf pine forests throughout coastal
Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana. 74 However, due to urban
development, the population dwindled to 100 gopher frogs occupying a
single pond in Mississippi at the time of listing.75
The dusky gopher frog breeds in ephemeral ponds and relies on upland
open-canopy pine forests to allow vegetation growth where the frog can
lay its eggs, feed on insects, and find holes to burrow.76 Due to the frog’s
small concentration in two adjacent counties in Mississippi and the risk
that a severe weather event or disease could jeopardize the dusky gopher
frog population, the FWS endeavored to designate unoccupied critical
habitat in 2010. 77 While the dusky gopher frog had not been seen in Unit
1 since 1965 when closed-canopy timber occupied the site, the FWS found
that “the site retained five ephemeral ponds ‘of remarkable quality,’ and
determined that an open-canopy forest could be restored on the
surrounding uplands ‘with reasonable effort.’” 78 The FWS subsequently
designated Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog. 79
B. Procedural History
Weyerhaeuser Company, a timber company that owns and leases
portions of Unit 1, and the lessors, who own the rest of Unit 1, filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana to
vacate the critical habitat designation. 80 While Weyerhaeuser’s timber
71. 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018).
72. Id. at 366 (emphasis omitted).
73. Final Rule to List the Mississippi Gopher Frog Distinct Population
Segment of Dusky Gopher Frog as Endangered, 66 Fed. Reg. 62,993 (Dec. 4,
2001).
74. Weyerhaeuser, 139 S. Ct. at 365.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Designation of Critical Habitat for Mississippi Gopher Frog, 75 Fed. Reg.
31,394 (Jun. 3, 2010).
78. Weyerhaeuser, 139 S. Ct. at 366 (quoting Designation of Critical Habitat
for Dusky Gopher Frog, 77 Fed. Reg. 35,118, 35,133, 35,135 (June 12, 2012)).
79. Designation of Critical Habitat for Dusky Gopher Frog, 77 Fed. Reg.
35,118, 35,133, 35,135 (June 12, 2012).
80. Weyerhaeuser, 139 S. Ct. at 366–67.
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operations were not likely to be directly impacted by the critical habitat
designation, the landowners had already invested in plans to develop the
area and believed that they would potentially need a Clean Water Act
permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers in order to fill
wetland to develop portions of Unit 1. 81 The Center for Biological
Diversity and Gulf Restoration Network intervened as defendants. 82 The
plaintiffs’ suit alleged that the FWS impermissibly designated Unit 1 as
critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog despite the fact that Unit 1 could
not constitute habitat for the dusky gopher frog since the frog could not
survive there in the land’s contemporaneous form. 83 The plaintiffs asserted
an area must be a habitat for a listed species in order to be designated as
critical habitat for that species, thus the FWS misinterpreted the ESA when
it designated Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog. 84
Since the plaintiffs were challenging an agency, the designation was
reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act to determine if the
action was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law.” 85 However, the standard of review is highly
deferential. 86 The plaintiffs’ challenge was based on the Services’
statutory interpretation of the ESA, specifically that Unit 1 does not meet
the definition of critical habitat under the ESA. Thus, the courts reviewed
the interpretation under the Chevron Test: (1) whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue, and (2) if the statute is
silent or ambiguous on the issue, whether the interpretation is
permissible. 87 If Congress has not directly spoken on the issue and the
agency’s interpretation is permissible or reasonable, then Chevron
deference applies, and the court will defer to the agency’s interpretation of
the statute. 88
81. Id. at 367.
82. Markle Interests, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 40 F. Supp. 3d 744,
753 (E.D. La. 2014), aff'd, 827 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2016), vacated & remanded sub
nom. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018), cert.
granted, vacated sub nom. Markle Interests, L.L.C. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
139 S. Ct. 590 (2018).
83. Weyerhaeuser's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary
Judgment at 1–2, Markle Interests, L.L.C. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 40 F.
Supp. 3d 744 (E.D. La. 2014) (Nos. 13-234, 13-362, 13-413), 2013 WL 7040456.
84. Id. at 2.
85. 5 U.S.C § 706(2) (2018).
86. Gulf Restoration Network v. McCarthy, 783 F.3d 227, 243 (5th Cir. 2015).
87. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984).
88. See id.; see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great
Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704, 708 (1995). The Service’s interpretation of the Act is
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Finding that the FWS reasonably determined Unit 1 was “essential for
the conservation of” the dusky gopher frog and was therefore entitled to
Chevron deference, the Eastern District upheld the designation. 89 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the petitioners’ assertion
that the definition of critical habitat contains a habitability requirement.90
The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, though six judges issued a
dissenting opinion favoring the petitioners’ argument. 91 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider the issue of whether critical habitat
under the ESA must be habitat. 92
C. The Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Court began its analysis with a grammatical interpretation of the
ESA. 93 The Court explained that “according to the ordinary understanding
of how adjectives work, ‘critical habitat’ must also be ‘habitat.’ Adjectives
modify nouns—they pick out a subset of a category that possesses a certain
quality.”94 Next, the Court analyzed “critical habitat” in the statutory
context. 95 The Court pointed to 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i), which states
that “when the Secretary lists a species as endangered he must also
‘designate any habitat of such species which is then considered to be
critical habitat.’ Only the ‘habitat’ of the endangered species is eligible for
designation as critical habitat.” 96
The Court then went further, explaining that “even if an area otherwise
meets the statutory definition of unoccupied critical habitat because the
entitled to Chevron deference provided it “rests on a permissible construction of
the ESA.” See id.
89. Markle Interests, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 40 F. Supp. 3d 744,
760 (E.D. La. 2014), aff'd, 827 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2016), vacated & remanded sub
nom. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018), cert.
granted, vacated sub nom. Markle Interests, L.L.C. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
139 S. Ct. 590 (2018).
90. Markle Interests, L.L.C. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 827 F.3d 452, 468
(5th Cir. 2016), vacated & remanded sub nom. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018), cert. granted, vacated sub nom. Markle
Interests, L.L.C. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 590 (2018).
91. Markle Interests, L.L.C. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 848 F.3d 635, 636
(5th Cir. 2017) (Jones, J., dissenting).
92. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 368
(2018).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Secretary finds the area essential for the conservation of the species, [16
U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i)] does not authorize the Secretary to designate
the area as critical habitat unless it is also habitat for the species.”97
Weyerhaeuser Co. contended “that habitat cannot include areas where the
species could not currently survive.”98 Considering that the Fifth Circuit
found no habitability requirement to critical habitat and therefore did not
have the occasion to interpret “habitat” as mentioned in 16 U.S.C. §
1533(a)(3)(A)(i), the Court vacated the judgment and remanded to the
Fifth Circuit for further consideration. 99
The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the Eastern District of
Louisiana. 100 Upon all parties reaching a settlement, the Eastern District
of Louisiana issued a consent decree on July 3, 2019. 101 The designation
of Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog was vacated, marking
an end to the nearly six and a half year legal battle.102
III. THE AFTERMATH OF WEYERHAEUSER
A. The Services’ Joint Rules: The 2019 Final Rule and the 2020 Final
Rule
On August 27, 2019, the Services published a final rule (2019 Final
Rule) changing how the ESA is implemented. 103 The 2019 Final Rule
amends 50 C.F.R. part 424 and among the new regulations is a change in
how critical habitat is designated. 104 Part of the impetus behind the rule
change was responding to the Weyerhaeuser decision. 105 When
designating critical habitat, the 2019 Final Rule will require the Services
to first evaluate areas occupied by the species.106 Only upon a
determination that “a critical habitat designation limited to geographical
areas occupied would be inadequate to ensure the conservation of the
97. Id.
98. Id. at 369.
99. Id.
100. Markle Interests, L.L.C. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 919 F.3d 963, 964
(5th Cir. 2019).
101. Consent Decree, supra note 13.
102. Id. at 3.
103. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Listing
Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 84 Fed. Reg. 45,020 (Aug. 27, 2019)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 424).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 45,022.
106. Id. at 45,021.
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species” may the Secretary designate unoccupied areas as critical
habitat. 107 Furthermore, the 2019 Final Rule seeks to address
Weyerhaeuser by adding a requirement that the Secretary may only
designate unoccupied areas as critical habitat based on a determination of
“reasonable certainty both that the area will contribute to the conservation
of the species and that the area contains one or more of those physical or
biological features essential to the conservation of the species.” 108 The
Services argue that this interpretation is based on the statute’s language,
structure, and legislative history. 109
The 2019 Final Rule was slated to take effect on September 26,
2019; 110 however, an environmental legal organization and a coalition of
states have filed separate suits in the Northern District of California to
block the rule’s passage, and the litigation is still ongoing. 111 Notably, the
2019 Final Rule leaves many questions unanswered. As the 2019 Final
Rule explicitly states, it does not “attempt to definitively resolve the full
meaning of the term ‘habitat.’” 112
Thus, on August 5, 2020, the Services published a proposed rule
(Proposed Rule) that would provide a definition of habitat. 113 The
Proposed Rule aimed to define habitat as follows: “The physical places
that individuals of a species depend upon to carry out one or more life
processes. Habitat includes areas with existing attributes that have the
capacity to support individuals of the species.”114 The Proposed Rule also
provides an “alternative” definition for which it seeks comment on: “The
physical places that individuals of a species use to carry out one or more
life processes. Habitat includes areas where individuals of the species do
not presently exist but have the capacity to support such individuals, only
where the necessary attributes to support the species presently exist.” 115

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 45,022.
110. Id.
111. See California v. Bernhardt, 460 F. Supp. 3d 875 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
112. Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 84 Fed. Reg. at 45,022.
113. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Listing
Endangered and Threatened Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 85 Fed.
Reg. 47,333, 47,334 (proposed Aug. 5, 2020) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. §
424.02).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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On December 16, 2020, the Services issued a Final Rule (2020 Final
Rule). 116 The 2020 Final Rule ultimately settled on the following
definition: “For the purposes of designating critical habitat only, habitat is
the abiotic and biotic setting that currently or periodically contains the
resources and conditions necessary to support one or more life processes
of a species.” 117 However, environmental legal organizations and a
coalition of states have once again filed suits to block the rule as they had
with the 2019 Final Rule. 118 Furthermore, the Biden Administration has
signaled that it will review environmental regulations promulgated during
the Trump presidency and modify or revoke policies and regulations that
it believes are inconsistent with the law or the new administration’s policy
objectives. 119 While the new definition became effective as of January 15,
2021, it is yet to be seen how the new presidential administration will treat
the 2020 Final Rule. The wake of rulemaking and litigation demonstrates
the uncertainty and policy issues left in the aftermath of Weyerhaeuser. As
this Comment will discuss later in Part III and in Part IV, defining habitat
is a difficult balancing act that provides the scope of critical habitat
designations. The 2020 Final Rule frames the policy debate and seeks to
resolve the issue, but as will be discussed later, addressing this issue
through administrative action rather than legislative action is inadequate
and presents issues of its own.
B. Unresolved Issues
Since critical habitat must be habitat, the threshold question is: what
is habitat? After Weyerhaeuser, the Fifth Circuit’s remand, and the
subsequent consent decree, this question remains unanswered. Based on a
lay understanding of the word “habitat,” it is obvious that an area generally
occupied by a species would constitute habitat. 120 Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “habitat” as “the place where a particular species of animal or plant
116. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Listing
Endangered and Threatened Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 85 Fed.
Reg. 81,411 (Dec. 16, 2020) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 424.02).
117. Id. at 81,412.
118. See Complaint, California v. Bernhardt, No. 4:21-cv-00440-LB (N.D.
Cal. Jan 19, 2021), available at http://climatecasechart.com/climate-changelitigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2021/20210119_docket-4
21-cv-00440_complaint-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK9Z-ZWZT].
119. Exec. Order No. 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 25, 2021).
120. See, e.g., Habitat, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). Most
dictionary definitions of “habitat” are based on the presence of the species in a
particular area.
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is normally found.”121 Hence, it should be uncontroversial to reason that
an area occupied by a species constitutes habitat.122
However, the real issue is defining “unoccupied habitat.” A plain
reading of the ESA demonstrates that the ESA clearly contemplates that
geographical areas not currently occupied by a species can potentially
constitute habitat. The definition of critical habitat in section 3(5)(A)(ii)
of the ESA provides that critical habitat can include “specific areas outside
the geographical area occupied by the species at the time [of listing]”
provided they are essential for the conservation of the species. 123 Since
critical habitat must be habitat, and the ESA provides that unoccupied
areas may be critical habitat, then logically, unoccupied areas can be
habitat. 124 However, as evidenced by Weyerhaeuser, unoccupied critical
habitat designations are the most contentious. 125 Furthermore, the
language of the ESA provides little guidance other than the prerequisite of
“essential for the conservation of the species.” 126
While unoccupied critical habitat designations are a small fraction of
all critical habitat designations, factors such as climate change and land
development will put further strain on the habitat needs of endangered and
threatened species. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
predicts that global warming will likely reach 1.5°C above pre-industrial
levels between 2030 and 2052 if it continues at its current rate. 127 Sea
levels are projected to rise between 1 and 2.5 feet by 2100. 128 Between 4
and 13 percent of global terrestrial land area is projected to undergo a
transformation of ecosystems, and 4 percent of vertebrates and 8 percent
121. Habitat, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
122. The Services interpret the statutory definition of “critical habitat” as it
applies to occupied habitat, to inherently verify that an area meeting that definition
is “habitat.” See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for
Listing Endangered and Threatened Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 85
Fed. Reg. 47,333, 47,334 (Aug. 5, 2020) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 424.02).
123. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) (2018).
124. Both definitions in the Proposed Rule seem to acknowledge this as well.
See Listing Endangered and Threatened Species and Designating Critical Habitat,
85 Fed. Reg. at 47,334.
125. See also, e.g., Bear Valley Mut. Water Co. v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 977, 994
(9th Cir. 2015).
126. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii).
127. Myles Allen et al., Summary for Policymakers, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, at 3, 4 (Valérie
Masson-Delmotte
et
al.
eds.,
2018),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019
/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_HR.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FNJ-AWSQ].
128. Id. at 7.
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of plant species may lose over half of their range. 129 It projects greater
weather extremes with some areas facing more droughts while others will
have increased precipitation. 130 With such changes, it is likely that many
species’ ranges will naturally shift or shrink and the Services will have to
designate additional critical habitat in order to prevent extinction and
support recovery efforts.
1. The Problem with Making the Definition of Habitat an
Administrative Decision
The 2019 Final Rule is effectively the third iteration of regulation
dictating the critical habitat designation process within the last decade.131
Until 2016, the only regulation governing unoccupied critical habitat
required the Services to “designate as critical habitat areas outside the
geographical area presently occupied by a species only when a designation
limited to its present range would be inadequate to ensure the conservation
of the species.”132 In 2016, the Services issued a rule completely
overhauling how unoccupied critical habitat was to be designated. 133 The
stated purpose for the rule change was “to clarify the procedures and
criteria used for designating critical habitat, addressing in particular
several key issues that have been subject to frequent litigation.” 134 The rule
replaced section 424.12(e) with section 424.12(b)(2), which required the
Services to “identify, at a scale determined by the [Services] to be
appropriate, specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the
species that are essential for its conservation, considering the life history,
status, and conservation needs of the species based on the best available
scientific data.” 135 Now, the 2019 Final Rule and 2020 Final Rule have
overhauled the critical habitat process once again.
Regardless of how habitat is ultimately defined, there are issues with
placing the responsibility of extrapolating a definition in the hands of the
executive branch. As noted above, this is the third time in the last decade
that regulations regarding the designation of unoccupied critical habitat
129. Id. at 8.
130. Id. at 7.
131. The 2020 Final Rule could be viewed as iteration 3.1 as it expands upon
the 2019 Final Rule.
132. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(e) (2012).
133. Listing Endangered and Threatened Species and Designating Critical
Habitat; Implementing Changes to the Regulations for Designating Critical
Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. 7414 (Feb. 11, 2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 424).
134. Id. at 7429.
135. Id. at 7439.
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have changed. 136 Moreover, each new presidential administration
regularly repeals, amends, or adds regulations. 137 The rules promulgated
by a previous administration are often delayed or suspended by the
incoming administration, and this is particularly true for cabinet-level
agencies. 138 As noted earlier, the Biden Administration has indicated that
it will review environmental regulations and many observers expect the
new regulations regarding critical habitat designations to be targeted. 139
In the wake of Weyerhaeuser, the definition of habitat is central to the
critical habitat designation process.140 Now that the Supreme Court has
clarified that critical habitat designations must be limited to habitat, the
definition of habitat provides the scope of critical habitat designations.141
The scope of critical habitat designations should not be determined by
political winds of change, but by the broad-based consensus of Congress
necessary to pass legislation. 142 Business interests need certainty, and
regulatory vacillations harm economic development. 143 Observers have
noted that “landowners and action agencies are generally well acquainted
with the lines on a map that depict designated critical habitat, and the mere
existence of designated critical habitat will often deter activities that might
otherwise affect protected species.” 144 Development projects take years to
136. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
137. Sharece Thrower, Regulatory Delay Across Administrations, BROOKINGS
(July 10, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/regulatory-delay-acrossadministrations/ [https://perma.cc/QG7D-UHFD].
138. Id.
139. Exec. Order No. 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 25, 2021); see Juliet
Eilperin, Brady Dennis & John Muyskens, Tracking Biden’s Environmental
Actions, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2021/climateenvironment/biden-climate-environment-actions/ [https://perma.cc/3DZ9-8TJZ]
(last updated Apr. 6, 2021).
140. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 369
(2018).
141. See id. (describing critical habitat as a subset of habitat).
142. See James & Ward, supra note 49, at 15–26 (Both passage of the ESA
and the 1978 amendment were achieved with overwhelming bipartisan support.
The amendment process in Congress encourages broad consensus and
compromise whereas executive rulemaking is often conducted unilaterally to
conform with the political goals of the administration in office.).
143. See Alexander K. Obrecht, Regulatory Uncertainty: A Case Study for
Applying A Predictable and Steady Hand, WYO. LAW., Dec. 2017, at 34, 36.
144. Andrew J. Turner & Kerry L. McGrath, A Wider View of the Impacts of
Critical Habitat Designation: A Comment on Critical Habitat and the Challenge
of Regulating Small Harms, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,678, 10,679
(2013).
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plan and execute, particularly when government permits are required.145
Changing standards for critical habitat designations creates regulatory
landmines for development interests. 146 Landowners and developers are
owed fair notice before investments are made of whether their project will
hit regulatory roadblocks. 147
Species recovery efforts are often impeded by ever-changing
regulations as well. 148 Critical habitat designations have ebbed and flowed
throughout the ESA’s history, often based on political preferences of the
presiding administration. 149 As Justice Scalia observed, regulatory
decisions are inherently political, “made by institutions whose managers
change with each presidential election and which are under the constant
political pressure of the congressional authorization and appropriations
processes.” 150 History has shown that the ESA’s implementation decisions
are no different. 151 This has led in part to the “large discrepancy between
statutory requirements and actual practice.” 152 As Dave Owen, an
environmental law expert and law professor, notes, “the process of
implementing the adverse modification prohibition remains a black box
with disputed outputs.” 153 A clearer statutory basis for critical habitat
designations would serve to insulate the process from wild regulatory
swings, ultimately leading to more efficient and transparent designations.
It is in the best interest of property rights, economic development, and
species recovery to regularize the critical habitat designation process.
2. The Challenge of Defining Habitat
While the Services have settled on a definition of habitat and clarified
the critical habitat designation process, the policy debate is just beginning.
145. See Andy Winkler, Accelerate the Permitting Process, BIPARTISAN
POL’Y CTR. (Feb. 2, 2017), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/accelerate-thepermitting-process/ [https://perma.cc/J55S-SL4E].
146. See discussion supra Part I (discussing the impacts of Section 7
consultation process and costs to applicants).
147. See discussion supra Part I (discussing the impacts of Section 7
consultation process and costs to applicants).
148. Owen, supra note 66, at 146.
149. See Darin, supra note 9, at 224; Petersen, supra note 3, at 468.
150. Antonin Scalia, Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies Under
Environmental Laws, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 97, 107 (1987).
151. Owen, supra note 66, at 186; see also Holly Doremus, Adaptive
Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of
“New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 62 (2001).
152. Owen, supra note 66, at 146.
153. Id. at 145–46.
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All signs point to continued litigation and regulatory battles over the
definition of habitat and the process of designating critical habitat. Thus,
it is important to understand the framework of the policy and legal debate
over what habitat means or should mean in the context of critical habitat
under the ESA.
a. Should Habitat be Habitable?
Must habitat be limited to an area where the species in question can
survive? The petitioners in Weyerhaeuser argued that habitat, as
contemplated by the ESA, must be habitable.154 Since the Supreme Court
remanded the question and no court ended up ruling on the issue, it is likely
that Weyerhaeuser Co.’s argument will be a blueprint for future parties
attempting to challenge designations of unoccupied critical habitat.
As Weyerhaeuser Co. noted, the ESA does not define “habitat.”155
While undefined or ambiguous terms of a statute often begin a Chevron
analysis, the absence of a statutory definition does not automatically
trigger deference. 156 Weyerhaeuser Co. noted that courts construe
undefined terms based on their “ordinary or natural meaning.”157
Weyerhaeuser Co. argued that considering areas that are not habitable for
a species as habitat is inconsistent with the ordinary or natural meaning,
because it fails the dictionary definition of habitat. 158 Most definitions of
habitat are based on the element of habitability. 159 Even the FWS’s Habitat
Conservation Planning Handbook and international conventions define
habitat based on habitable qualities. 160 Furthermore, broader definitions,
which the FWS cites, require habitat to be naturally occurring and not in
need of restoration. 161 As commonly understood, habitat indicates being
able to support a species. 162
154. Brief for Petitioner at 22–23, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018) (No. 17-71), 2018 WL 1960816, at *22–23.
155. Id. at 23.
156. E.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159, 172, 174 (2001).
157. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4, Weyerhaeuser, 139 S. Ct. 361 (No. 1771), 2018 WL 3854758, at *4 (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994)).
158. Id.; see also Habitat, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also,
e.g., Habitat, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (describing habitat as
the “locality in which a plant or animal naturally grows or lives”).
159. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 157, at 4.
160. Id. at 4–5.
161. Id. at 5.
162. Id. at 6.
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In addition to the dictionary definition of habitat, Weyerhaeuser Co.
argued that habitat in the statutory context of the ESA requires habitability.
Section 3(5)(C) provides that “critical habitat” generally “shall not include
the entire geographical area which can be occupied” by the species.163
Weyerhaeuser Co. argued that this provision, when read in pari materia
with the definition of critical habitat in subpart (5)(A), means that only
areas capable of being occupied by the species may be deemed critical
habitat. 164 Section 3(5)(C) of the ESA clearly contemplates both occupied
and unoccupied critical habitat by employing the phrase “can be occupied”
rather than is occupied. 165 However, the logical implication of this
language is that only areas that “can be occupied” are eligible for critical
habitat designations. 166
Despite these arguments, there are numerous issues resulting from
such a limited definition of habitat.167 First, the FWS, the respondent in
Weyerhaeuser, argued that even some dictionary definitions of habitat are
broader than just habitability—“kind of locality;” “site or region with
respect to physical features normally preferred by biological species;”
“native environment of an animal or plant;” and “the kind of place that is
natural for the life and growth of an animal or plant,” to name a few. 168
Additionally, as the Center for Biological Diversity, the intervenorrespondent in Weyerhaeuser, discussed, the ESA uses the term “habitat”
more liberally than the strict habitable sense in another section of the
statute. 169 For example, Section 8a(e)(2)(B) requires international
cooperation in identifying “habitats upon which [migratory birds]
depend.” 170 Furthermore, Congress has also used the term habitat outside
of a strict habitable sense in other conservation statutes. 171 For example,
the Marine Turtle Conservation Act of 2004 describes the “nesting
habitat” for marine turtles and the Coast Barrier Resources Act describes

163. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(C) (2018).
164. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 157, at 7–8. See 16 U.S.C §
1532(5)(A), (C).
165. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(C).
166. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 157, at 7–8.
167. Brief for the Federal Respondents at 33, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish
& Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018) (No. 17-71), 2018 WL 3238924, at *33.
168. Id. (internal citations and emphasis omitted).
169. Brief for Intervenor-Respondents at 44, Weyerhaeuser, 139 S. Ct. 361
(No. 17-71), 2018 WL 3217374, at *44.
170. 16 U.S.C. § 1537(a)(e)(2)(B).
171. Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 167, at 29. See, e.g., 16
U.S.C §§ 6602(2), 6603(b)(1)(A) (nesting habitats of marine turtles, etc.).
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the habitat essential for “spawning, nursery, nesting, and feeding.”172
Finally, the courts have used the term habitat to describe areas that do not
fit the strict definition asserted by Weyerhaeuser Co. 173 As a matter of fact,
the Ninth Circuit has stated explicitly that “there is no support for this
contention in the text of the ESA or the implementing regulation, which
requires the Service[s] to show that the area is ‘essential,’ without further
defining that term as ‘habitable.’” 174
Some of the statutory construction undercuts a strict definition of
habitat as well. While the definition of occupied critical habitat is tied to
“physical or biological features” that are essential, the definition of
unoccupied critical habitat is based upon “areas” that are deemed
essential. 175 While Weyerhaeuser Co. asserted that the two definitions are
related and the structure implies that “features” are necessary to be deemed
essential, it is just as reasonable to interpret the omission of features from
the unoccupied definition as deliberate to allow increased flexibility in
unoccupied critical habitat designations. 176 In addition, even if section
3(5)(C) requires critical habitat to be limited to areas that “can be
occupied,” the phrase “can be occupied” is not necessarily synonymous
with habitability as described by Weyerhaeuser Co. A geographical area’s
“occupied” status is a “highly contextual and fact-dependent inquiry”
which is subject to various factors such as frequency and nature of use of
the area rather than purely whether a species can survive in a localized
area. 177
The biggest strike against interpreting the ESA as requiring
unoccupied critical habitat to be habitable is that this would undermine the
ESA’s goal of species recovery. 178 Each listed species’ recovery needs are
unique, and inflexibility will restrain recovery efforts. 179 Some listed
species may not have sufficient habitable areas available to survive and
the restoration of habitat may be the only option to prevent extinction of

172. 16 U.S.C. § 6602(2); 16 U.S.C. § 3501(a)(1)(B).
173. See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 167, at 29.
174. Bear Valley Mut. Water Co. v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 977, 994 (9th Cir. 2015).
To be fair, this assertion could be construed as dicta and carries less weight in
light of Weyerhaeuser, 139 S. Ct. 361.
175. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A).
176. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 157, at 7–8.
177. Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010).
178. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
179. See Brief of Amici Curiae Scientists in Support of Respondents at 15–16,
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018) (No. 1771), 2018 WL 3375001, at *15–16.
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those species. 180 Historically, the courts have upheld critical habitat
designations of unoccupied areas that do not fit in the strict definition of
habitable. 181 Courts have recognized critical habitat designations of
migratory areas, seasonal areas, areas where a species is to be
reintroduced, and even areas that the species could never occupy but still
relies upon. 182
Further, Judge Owen’s dissent from the Fifth Circuit opinion agreed
that not all unoccupied areas must be habitable in order to be designated
critical habitat.183 Judge Owen’s dissent distinguished Unit 1’s designation
from situations where areas unoccupied by an endangered species
“provide[] elements to neighboring or downstream property that are
essential to the survival of the species in the areas that it does occupy.”184
However, the dissent suggested that areas that support a species’ survival,
short of being strictly habitable, could be eligible for critical habitat
designation. 185
Finally, habitat is dynamic. 186 Critical habitat might be suitable for a
species when it is designated, but may then become degraded over time. 187
180. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of
Critical Habitat for Mississippi Gopher Frog, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,387, 31,390
(proposed June 3, 2010). FWS designation of Unit 1 was the result of litigation
asserting that the Dusky Gopher Frog had insufficient critical habitat and FWS
deemed that restoration of habitat was necessary to achieve its recovery goals for
the Dusky Gopher Frog. See Stipulated Settlement with [Proposed] Order, Friends
of Miss. Pub. Lands v. Kempthorne, No. 1:07-cv-02073-RBW (D.D.C. June 11,
2008), ECF No. 7.
181. See, e.g., Bear Valley Mut. Water Co. v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 977, 994 (9th
Cir. 2015).
182. See, e.g., id. (upholding an unoccupied critical habitat designation for an
area where the species could not survive but provided essential elements for the
survival of the species); Aina Nui Corp. v. Jewell, 52 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1129 (D.
Haw. 2014) (upholding an unoccupied critical habitat designation for the purpose
of providing “suitable habitat and space for expansion or reintroduction”).
183. Markle Interests, L.L.C. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 827 F.3d 452,
483–84 (5th Cir. 2016) (Owen, J., dissenting), vacated & remanded, 139 S. Ct.
590 (2018).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Brief of Amici Curiae Scientists in Support of Respondents, supra note
179, at 8.
187. See Brief for Intervenor-Respondents, supra note 169, at 5 (noting that
the ESA’s definition of unoccupied critical habitat is tacit acknowledgment that
“merely protecting the curtailed or degraded areas an endangered species
currently occupies will, for many species, preclude recovery”).
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Conversely, areas that were not initially suitable for a species may change
or improve over time to the point where they can support the species.188
Climate change only compounds this issue. 189 Rising sea levels and
changing climate shifts, shrinks, and possibly even expands, in some
instances, the ranges of listed species. 190 These inevitable changes will
require the Services to examine designating unoccupied critical habitat
more often, and while biospheres are in flux, construing habitat on the
basis of habitability will restrain recovery efforts and ultimately imperil
more species. 191
b. Should the Services Adopt a Broad Definition of Habitat?
If habitat does not carry a habitable requirement, should the Services
adopt a broad definition of habitat? The FWS described the Services’
understanding of “habitat” as a “case-by-case application.”192 Since the
ESA’s enactment, the Services have designated areas as critical habitat
because these areas were deemed essential for the conservation of the
species and not necessarily based on whether the species could survive
there. 193 As the FWS noted, “‘habitat’ is not limited to areas that
simultaneously provide optimal conditions for every stage of a species’
life cycle.” 194 The Services contend that habitat should be understood
broadly since it may vary in suitability and purpose for each species. 195
The grammatical context of the term “habitat” in Section 4 of the ESA
supports the notion that definition of habitat should be broad. 196 Section 4
provides that “any habitat” of the species is eligible to be considered as
critical habitat.197 While it supports the notion that critical habitat is a
188. See 16 U.S.C § 1533(a)(3)(A)(ii) (2018) (provision that allows the
Services to modify and revise critical habitat designations, which is an
acknowledgement that a species’ habitual needs may change as conditions
improve or deteriorate).
189. See Allen et al., supra note 127.
190. Id. at 8–9.
191. See Olivia Bensinger, Endangered Species Act to the Rescue? Climate
Change Mitigation and Adaptation Under the ESA, N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. (Mar. 29,
2017), https://www.nyuelj.org/2017/03/endangered-species-act-rescue/ [https://
perma.cc/EW3C-VB52].
192. Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 167, at 25.
193. See 16 U.S.C §§ 1532(5)(A), 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) (2018); Brief for the
Federal Respondents, supra note 167, at 34.
194. Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 167, at 26.
195. Id.
196. See 16 U.S.C § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i).
197. Id. (emphasis added).
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subset of habitat, the word “any” contemplates a designation from a larger
group that is not necessarily uniform. 198 Therefore, the phrase “any
habitat” connotes that a species may have multiple habitats that may vary
in suitability. 199 As noted previously, the Services designate, and courts
uphold, critical habitat designations of areas that cannot strictly support a
species in all circumstances. 200
Some of the legislative history supports a broader definition of habitat
as well. As the FWS contended, Congress rejected “language that would
have permitted designation of unoccupied areas only if ‘the species can be
expected to expand naturally’ to those areas.” 201 Additionally, the 1978
Amendment ultimately framed the definition of critical habitat in terms of
what is “essential for the conservation of the species.” 202 The focus on
conservation rather than survival of a species highlights Congress’s intent
that the ESA would be broad and flexible enough to support species
recovery. 203
A species’ environmental needs often change throughout different
stages of that species’ lifecycle. 204 One area may be suitable for foraging
and hunting, but not for nesting. 205 An anadromous fish may spawn in
freshwater and mature in saltwater. 206 Migratory species may only use
areas seasonally and, more so, as a stopover in areas along their migratory
path that could never sustain a species long term. 207 While these areas
cannot sustain a species alone or at all times, it would be absurd to exclude
these areas from being considered habitat. In Bear Valley Mutual Water
Co. v. Jewell, the Ninth Circuit went further, upholding a designation of
unoccupied critical habitat that the species could not occupy but was

198. Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 167, at 29.
199. Id.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 180–82.
201. Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 167, at 39 (quoting CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., S. COMM. ON ENV’T & PUB. WORKS, 97TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, AS AMENDED IN 1976, 1977,
1978, 1979, AND 1980, at 1169–70 (Comm. Print 1982)).
202. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i)–(ii) (2018).
203. Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 167, at 39; Brief for
Intervenor-Respondents, supra note 169, at 35.
204. Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 167, at 29.
205. See Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616
F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing how essential elements upon which a
species relies may be in “distinct areas”).
206. Brief for Intervenor-Respondents, supra note 169, at 35.
207. Id. at 44.
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deemed essential because it provided elements downstream to occupied
areas that were necessary for the species survival.208
While there could be potential benefits to having a broad definition of
habitat, the FWS and Center for Biological Diversity’s purported
understanding of habitat provides little clarity to how the term should be
defined. 209 Both parties made a strong argument as to what could or should
constitute habitat but did not provide any explanation on what would not
qualify as habitat. Ultimately, critical habitat designations would be based
on the Services’ determination that an area is essential for the conservation
of the species, which is equally ambiguous. Such a broad definition of
habitat, which is so ambiguous that it can hardly be considered a
definition, is inconsistent with legislative intent of the ESA and the
holding of Weyerhaeuser. 210
Specific language in the ESA undercuts an expansive definition of
habitat. As noted earlier, section 3(5)(C) provides that “critical habitat”
generally “shall not include the entire geographical area which can be
occupied” by the species. 211 The implication of section 3(5)(C) is that only
areas that “can be occupied” can be considered critical habitat.212 While
Bear Valley suggests that there is no requirement that an area be
occupiable by a species, there is no evidence that the Ninth Circuit
considered the language in section 3(5)(C). 213 Additionally, Bear Valley
was decided before Weyerhaeuser, thus its holding is significantly less
persuasive. 214 If critical habitat must be habitat, it would be difficult to
claim an area that could not be not be occupied by a species is habitat.
In addition, the ESA’s structure cuts against a broad-based definition
of habitat. Weyerhaeuser Co. pointed out that areas, whether occupied or
unoccupied, must be “essential” for the conservation of the species to be
designated critical habitat. 215 Occupied critical habitat is defined as areas
that contain “features” that are “essential to the conservation of the
species” and “which may require special management considerations or
protection.” 216 Unoccupied critical habitat is defined as “areas” that “are
208. Bear Valley Mut. Water Co. v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 977, 994 (9th Cir. 2015).
209. Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 167, at 28; Brief for
Intervenor-Respondents, supra note 169, at 33.
210. See James & Ward, supra note 49, at 26 (discussing how Congress sought
to narrow the scope of critical habitat designations).
211. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(C) (2018).
212. Id.; Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 157, at 7–8.
213. See Bear Valley Mut. Water Co., 790 F.3d 977.
214. See id.
215. 16 U.S.C § 1532(5)(A); Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 157, at 7.
216. 16 U.S.C § 1532(5)(A)(i).
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essential for the conservation of species.”217 Based on the former
definition, “essential” must be linked to “physical or biological features”
of occupied critical habitat.218 As noted earlier, a logical reading of the
definition of unoccupied critical habitat is that it is a secondary alternative
to occupied critical habitat and carries the same requirements as occupied
critical habitat with the obvious exception of the presence of the species.219
Courts and most legal experts have observed that the test for unoccupied
critical habitat is supposed to be “more stringent” than occupied critical
habitat designation. 220 If the definition of unoccupied critical habitat does
not have an implied requirement of “physical or biological features,” it
would be less stringent than the occupied critical habitat standard. 221
The legislative history of the ESA demonstrates that Congress has
been wary of wide-ranging discretion in critical habitat designations. In
the wake of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, Congress limited the
Services’ discretion in critical habitat designations in the 1978
Amendment to the ESA by adding a definition of critical habitat. 222 By
adding its own definition, Congress rebuked the broader definition that the
Services had adopted and that the Supreme Court analyzed in Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill. 223 Legal experts observe that “Congress added the
definition of “critical habitat” to the ESA in 1978 to “narrow[] the scope
of the term as it is defined in the existing regulations.” 224 Therefore, a
broad and ambiguous standard that affords wide discretion in critical
habitat designations to the Services is inconsistent with Congress’s intent
behind the ESA’s 1978 Amendment. 225
Furthermore, based on Weyerhaeuser, habitat must have some sort of
limiting principle.226 As Judge Owen observed in her dissent from the Fifth
Circuit opinion, a broad interpretation of “‘essential’ means that virtually
any part of the United States could be designated as ‘critical habitat’ for
217. 16 U.S.C § 1532(5)(A)(ii).
218. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 157, at 7.
219. Id. at 7–8.
220. Id.; see also James & Ward, supra note 49, at 30.
221. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 157, at 7–8.
222. James & Ward, supra note 49, at 30.
223. Id. at 15.
224. Id. at 30.
225. See id.
226. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Services, 139 S. Ct. 361,
369 (2018). The Supreme Court has endorsed the concept that critical habitat is a
subset of habitat. Thus, habitat must have some defining parameters or else the
Court’s holding would be meaningless. Something can only be a subset if it is a
portion of a defined category or group.
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any given endangered species so long as the property could be modified
in a way that would support introduction and subsequent conservation of
the species on it.” 227 Without limiting principles of what can reasonably
constitute habitat in the context of unoccupied areas, the Services would
have “nearly limitless authority to burden private lands with a critical
habitat designation.” 228 According to the Supreme Court’s holding in
Weyerhaeuser, critical habitat must be a subset of habitat. 229 If habitat is
just a synonym for land or specified area, then anywhere could be deemed
critical habitat provided the Services justify the area as being essential. In
the words of Judge Owen, “This is not a reasonable construction of §
1532(5)(A)(2).” 230
Finally, policy reasons contradict a limitless definition of habitat. The
critical habitat designation process needs to be transparent, predictable,
and met with public buy-in. A broad definition of habitat is too ambiguous
to accomplish this goal. As discussed earlier, the Services will likely need
to make more unoccupied critical habitat designations in the future.231
However, the Services should only make such designations when
necessary and with fair notice to the parties that will be affected.
Landowners, investors, and businesses need fair notice of a possible
critical habitat designation.232 If the definition of habitat is amorphous,
affected parties have no way of predicting a future critical habitat
designation, particularly when the land is unoccupied. 233 Unforeseen
critical habitat designations are likely to be received as regulatory zealotry
and overreach. 234 Perceived overreaches will be typically met with
political backlash either through funding cuts or regulatory rollbacks from
a future administration.235 Ultimately, unpredictable critical habitat
designations will damage species recovery and the goals of the ESA.

227. Markle Interests, L.L.C. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 827 F.3d 452, 483
(5th Cir. 2016) (Owen, J., dissenting), vacated & remanded, 139 S. Ct. 590
(2018).
228. Id. at 471.
229. Weyerhaeuser, 139 S. Ct. at 368.
230. Markle Interests, 827 F.3d at 483 (Owen, J., dissenting).
231. See discussion supra Part III.B.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 143–47.
233. See Owen, supra note 66, at 180 (on how critical habitat designations
serve as a signal to federal agencies and private entities for possible ESA-related
regulatory constraints).
234. See Salzman, supra note 69, at 335–37.
235. Owen, supra note 66, at 190.
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IV. SOLUTION
A. Amending the Endangered Species Act
The definition of critical habitat has not been revisited by Congress
since 1978, five years after the ESA was first enacted. 236 Over the last four
decades, the Services and courts have struggled to extricate Congress’s
intent. 237 The definition of critical habitat under the ESA is too important
to leave up to the executive branch. 238 Leaving the definition to the
administrative state allows the foundation of the ESA to swing in political
winds with every new election of a presidential administration. 239 Since
critical habitat is often the primary reason for section 7 consultations, the
definition of critical habitat goes to the scope of the ESA and merits a
debate in Congress. Thus, Congress should amend the ESA to provide a
definition of habitat that clearly addresses unoccupied critical habitat. The
current definition of unoccupied critical habitat is too vague, as evidenced
by Weyerhaeuser, and it is time for Congress to define the limits of the
ESA and weigh and debate the government’s interest in preserving
biodiversity against economic development and the rights of property
owners. The current status quo creates uncertainty for property owners and
undermines the long-term conservation goals of the statute.
If Congress were to amend the ESA, it should follow the policy
analysis that the Services articulate in the 2019 Final Rule and the 2020
Final Rule by explicitly prioritizing occupied critical habitat designations
over unoccupied and providing a definition of habitat. Amending critical
habitat designations to prioritize occupied critical habitat over unoccupied
critical habitat would ratify the prevailing view of how critical habitat is
to be designated and make critical habitat designations less contentious.240
Moreover, providing a new definition of habitat that is flexible enough
to adequately serve the conservation and recovery goals of the ESA, but
also must provide transparency and predictability to stakeholders, is
critical. To achieve this goal, Congress should adopt the definition in the
2020 Final Rule: “For the purposes of designating critical habitat only,
habitat is the abiotic and biotic setting that currently or periodically
contains the resources and conditions necessary to support one or more

236.
237.
(2018).
238.
239.
240.

James & Ward, supra note 49, at 24.
See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See id.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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life processes of a species.” 241 This definition would be more flexible than
a habitability-based definition of habitat, but more definitive than a broadbased, ambiguous definition championed by the FWS and the Center for
Biological Diversity in Weyerhaeuser.
A core goal of the ESA is species recovery. 242 It is foreseeable that
some species will require restored unoccupied habitat particularly in light
of climate change. 243 As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “The purpose of
establishing ‘critical habitat’ is for the government to carve out territory
that is not only necessary for the species’ survival but also essential for the
species’ recovery.” 244 If a species is limited to an ever-shrinking habitat,
recovery is out of the question and the species’ survival comes into
question. Opening up the possibility of designating unoccupied critical
habitat for restoration purposes conjures a parade of horribles.245
However, the requirement that habitat “currently or periodically contains
resources and conditions necessary to support [a species’ lifecycle]”
provides a meaningful check against government overreach and fair notice
to landowners and developers.
The new definition of habitat will allow the Services to designate
essential critical habitat in a variety of foreseeable circumstances.
Habitable areas would constitute an “abiotic and biotic setting that
currently or periodically contains the resources and conditions necessary
to support one or more life processes of a species.” 246 Seasonal, migratory,
or intermittently used areas also qualify as areas that “currently or
periodically contain[] the resources and conditions necessary to support”
life processes of a species. 247 Areas that provide essential elements, such
as in Bear Valley, by definition contain “resources and conditions”
necessary to support species’ life processes. 248 Only restoration habitat
241. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Listing
Endangered and Threatened Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 85 Fed.
Reg. 81,411, 81,412 (Dec. 16, 2020) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 424.02).
242. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2018).
243. Allen et al., supra note 127, at 8–9.
244. Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059,
1070 (9th Cir.), amended, 387 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2004).
245. See Brief for Alabama and 19 Additional States as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 4, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139
S. Ct. 361 (2018) (No. 17-71), 2018 WL 2059535, at *4.
246. Listing Endangered and Threatened Species and Designating Critical
Habitat, 85 Fed. Reg. at 81,412.
247. Id. The 2020 Final Rule demonstrates that the Services view seasonally
or intermittently used areas as habitat.
248. Bear Valley Mutual Water Co. v. Jewell, 790 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2015).
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would be in question meeting such a definition of habitat. However, this
is the area where the Services should apply the most discretion. If an area
does not at least “periodically” contain “resources and conditions” that
support a species lifecycle, developers and property owners will have no
notice of a potential critical habitat designation.249 The new definition
would protect against such actions and tie restoration efforts to areas with
a meaningful standard of habitat.
The new definition would help the Services account for the dynamic
nature of habitat. Areas may slowly lose or gain “resources and
conditions” naturally, and the “abiotic and biotic setting” that is “necessary
to support” a species’ life processes may change. 250 Using this definition
of habitat gives the needed flexibility to proactively make new
designations and account for naturally degrading critical habitats as time
progresses. 251 Statutorizing the definition will provide clarity to the courts
and litigants by eliminating the quandary of having to hash out the
definition of habitat in a manner consistent with critical habitat
jurisprudence. 252 It will help insulate the critical habitat designation
process from political influence and provide certainty and continuity that
will benefit both species recovery and property interests. 253
That is not to say the new rule could not be improved. The “resources
and conditions” terminology is vague and should be substituted for a term
more familiar with parties that regularly deal with the ESA: “physical or
biological features.” However, as the Services explained, they
“intentionally chose not to use the statutory phrase ‘physical or biological
features’ to avoid conflating the statutory language regarding occupied
critical habitat with that of the broader definition of ‘habitat’ promulgated
[in the rule].”254 Either way, a robust debate in Congress could flesh out
the best phraseology. For these reasons, providing a definition of habitat
through the legislative process is the most reasonable solution to deal with
the fallout of Weyerhaeuser.
Considering contemporary political realities, it is unlikely that
Congress will address the statutory pitfalls of the ESA’s critical habitat

249. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 154, at 28.
250. See Allen et al., supra note 127, at 8–9.
251. See discussion supra Part III.A.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Listing
Endangered and Threatened Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 85 Fed.
Reg. 81,411, 81,412 (Dec. 16, 2020) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 424.02).
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definition any time soon. 255 When Congress passed the ESA in 1973 and
the subsequent 1978 Amendment, it did so with overwhelming bipartisan
support. 256 Under the 116th Congress, the most notable bill supported by
the Democratic Caucus, introduced by Representative Raúl M. Grijalva
(D-AZ), the current Natural Resources Committee Chair, was H.R.
4348. 257 This bill seeks to void the recent rule change, but does so without
any further guidance to the implementing agencies. 258 This will
unfortunately only lead to more chaos and uncertainty in the wake of
Weyerhaeuser. 259 On the Republican side of the aisle, Representative
Mike Johnson (R-LA) introduced a bill entitled the “Critical Habitat
Improvement Act.”260 Notably, this bill seems to favor a more restrictive
view of habitat by requiring that unoccupied critical habitat be “able to
sustain occupancy by such species.”261 While the bill seems to overhaul
the definition of critical habitat in a way that addresses Weyerhaeuser,
strict occupancy capability requirements present aforementioned issues.262
Occupancy is analogous to habitability and, as noted before, species can
often rely on areas that they do not strictly occupy. 263
B. If There is No Congressional Action
If Congress does not amend the ESA, the Service’s 2019 Final Rule
and 2020 Final Rule are the best intermediary solutions. First, the 2019
Final Rule makes clear that critical habitat designations should focus first
on occupied areas before unoccupied areas. 264 The majority view among
legal experts is that the ESA’s language, structure, and legislative history
suggest that occupied areas should be the primary focus of critical habitat

255. Derek Willis & Paul Kane, How Congress Stopped Working,
PROPUBLICA (Nov. 5, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/howcongress-stopped-working [https://perma.cc/74BQ-ET8Q].
256. James & Ward, supra note 49, at 24.
257. PAW and FIN Conservation Act of 2019, H.R. 4348, 116th Cong. (2019).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. H.R. 5591, 116th Cong. (2020).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.a.
264. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Listing
Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 84 Fed. Reg. 45,020 (Aug. 27, 2019)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 424).
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designations and unoccupied areas should only be considered as an
alternative. 265
Furthermore, prioritizing occupied critical habitat designations is a
prudent political and legal decision. Focusing on less controversial options
will dispel charges of administrative zealotry and inhibit political backlash
that would ultimately lead to adverse outcomes. 266 Critical habitat
designations of occupied areas will draw less legal scrutiny and can be
more easily justified. 267 Moreover, the Services’ attempt to provide a
definition of habitat will help ensure uniformity and transparency in
critical habitat designations. As the Services explained when it first
proposed the rule defining habitat, “the proposed regulatory definition of
‘habitat’ would not impose any additional procedural steps or change in
how we designate critical habitat, but would instead serve as a regulatory
standard to help ensure that unoccupied areas that we designate as critical
habitat are ‘habitat’ for the species and are defensible as such.”268
Additionally, the 2019 Final Rule and 2020 Final Rule are the only
regulations that address Weyerhaeuser. 269 If the Services had not taken any
regulatory action, it would have been foreseeable that similar cases to
Weyerhaeuser could arise again. These regulations demonstrate that the
Services are attempting to comply with the key holding of
Weyerhaeuser—critical habitat must be habitat.270 If the agencies failed to
take any action, future litigation over critical habitat designations would
be certain as it would suggest that the Services ignored the Supreme
Court’s ruling.
Critics are likely to argue that the Services are reading in a nonexistent
requirement to the definition of unoccupied critical habitat, since section
3(5)(A)(ii) of the ESA makes no reference to “physical or biological

265. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 157, at 7–8; see also Home Builders
Ass'n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010)
(describing how the standard for unoccupied critical habitat is a more demanding
standard than that of occupied critical habitat); James & Ward, supra note 49, at
30.
266. Owen, supra note 66, at 146.
267. Id.
268. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Listing
Endangered and Threatened Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 85 Fed.
Reg. 47,333, 47,335 (Aug. 5, 2020) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 424.02).
269. Listing Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 84 Fed. Reg. at 45,022.
270. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 369
(2018).
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features.” 271 However, a reasonable statutory construction indicates that
features are required for not just occupied, but also unoccupied critical
habitat. 272 First, most legal experts agree that the test for unoccupied
critical habitat is more stringent than critical habitat.273 Second, section
3(5)(C) uses the language “can be occupied,” which supports an
interpretation that features have to be present to be designated as critical
habitat. 274 Finally, the Supreme Court’s holding in Weyerhaeuser that
critical habitat must be habitat supports the notion that there is a features
requirement implicit to all critical habitat.275
The 2020 Final Rule is equally prudent, as the holding in
Weyerhaeuser tacitly requires the Services to come up with a definition of
habitat. 276 As noted above, the Supreme Court remanded on grounds that
“the [Fifth Circuit] . . . had no occasion to interpret the term ‘habitat’ in
section 4(a)(3)(A)(i) or to assess [FWS’s] administrative findings
regarding Unit 1.”277 It is reasonable to infer that the Services sought a
consent decree at that point in order to give the agency time to conduct
proper rulemaking through the notice and comment process rather than
trying to arrive at a definition, or more likely partial definition, of habitat
through litigation. Regardless, the Services would have been tasked with
providing an interpretation of the term “habitat” at some point.
The 2019 Final Rule and 2020 Final Rule provide needed transparency
and consistency in critical habitat designations. The 2019 Final Rule’s
“reasonable certainty” standard helps assure the public that designations
are not the result of speculation or administrative overreach and is
consistent with the “to the maximum extent prudent and determinable”
271. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) (2018); see also Brief for the Federal
Respondents, supra note 167, at 40; Brief for Intervenor-Respondents, supra note
169, at 34; Markle Interests, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 40 F. Supp. 3d
744, 761 (E.D. La. 2014); Markle Interests, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
827 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2016).
272. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 157, at 7-8; see also 16 U.S.C §
1532 (5)(A), (C).
273. E.g., Steven Quarles et al., Critical Habitat in Critical Condition: Can
Controversial New Rules Revive It?, NAT. RESOURCES & E NV'T, Summer 2015,
at 8, 10.
274. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(C). An area that “can be occupied” would logically
have physical or biological features. This is particularly true since the definition
of occupied critical habitat in section 3(5)(A)(i) requires physical or biological
features.
275. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
276. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 369
(2018).
277. Id.
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standard provided in section 4(a)(3)(A) of the ESA.278 More importantly,
the Services’ definition of habitat will provide a “regulatory standard” that
not only will create transparency on its own accord but will be formed
through the notice and comment rulemaking process. 279
The changes to unoccupied critical habitat designations set forth in the
2019 Final Rule are consistent with the text and structure of the ESA and
even more so in the context of Weyerhaeuser. 280 The 2020 Final Rule’s
effort to define habitat is necessary and reasonable. Both agency actions
will make critical habitat designations more transparent and consistent
with the text of the ESA and Congressional intent.
CONCLUSION
Critical habitat designations have been and will continue to be
contentious. 281 Critical habitat designation is an important tool of the ESA
in combating extinction and has certainly played a role in preserving
endangered and threatened species. However, critical habitat designations
also carry potential economic costs and restrain the rights of property
owners. Due to this tension, it is imperative that the ESA provide clear
guidelines on what areas are eligible to be designated as critical habitat.
Unfortunately, due to the varying needs of listed species and the wide
discretion the ESA provides to the Services, there is much uncertainty and
ambiguity when designating critical habitat, particularly unoccupied
critical habitat.
Fortunately, the recent case of Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service brought a spotlight to this issue and provided marginal
clarity, but questions still remain. The onus is on Congress to amend the
ESA and provide stronger guidelines on how the Services are to designate
unoccupied critical habitat. Legislatively prioritizing occupied critical
habitat designations over unoccupied and defining habitat will perpetuate
the flexibility required for species recovery, while also providing fair
notice to landowners and developers. Furthermore, it will provide for a
more uniform implementation of critical habitat designations.
If Congress does not act, the 2019 Final Rule and 2020 Final Rule
published by the Services are the best intermediary solution. Both rules
are the only regulations that address the holding of Weyerhaeuser and are
278. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
279. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Listing
Endangered and Threatened Species and Designating Critical Habitat, 85 Fed.
Reg. 47,333, 47,335 (Aug. 5, 2020) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 424.02).
280. See discussion supra Part III.
281. Owen, supra note 66, at 182–88; see also discussion supra Part I.D.
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consistent with the language, structure, and legislative intent of the ESA.
The 2020 Final Rule’s definitions of habitat are reasonable and strike a
balance between accounting for the various habitat needs of threatened and
endangered species while providing transparency, clarity, and consistency
for stakeholders. Both actions will improve the critical habitat designation
process.
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